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Abstract
In this paper, we develop and analyze a classic dynamic model of irreversible in-
vestment under imperfect competition and stochastic demand. We characterize the
markovian equilibrium when player￿ s strategies are continuous in the state variable.
At the equilibrium, ￿rms invest as quickly as possible in order to join a zone in the
space of capacities where there is no competition pressure. Furthermore, the equilib-
rium as an e¢ ciency property: the point of this area which is reach by the ￿rms is the
point which minimizes the investment cost of the all industry.
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21 Introduction
Capacity expansion or reduction under uncertainty is one of the most important de-
cisions that ￿rms can made. It impacts their immediate pro￿t and creates some long-run
commitments. In a dynamic setting, the investment pattern by a monopoly is well known.
Because of the uncertainty, the ￿rm has incentives to delay a pro￿table project (in expect-
ation) in order to wait for more information about the demand. This is the theory of real
options. What happens in imperfect competition becomes the theory of real option games.
(For recent surveys, see for instance Boyer, Gravel and Lasserre (2004), Azevedo and Paxson
(2010), or Chevalier-Roignant et al (2011)).
In this literature several authors focused on capacity decision under uncertainty. In
these models, at each time the pro￿t made by a ￿rm depends of its size (i.e. its capacity),
the size of its opponents, and a parameter which evolves randomly with time (which can
be a parameter of demand or cost, the important point being that its future evolution are
unknown). As this parameter evolves, ￿rms wish to adapt their sizes. Firms can either
invest to increase their capacity, disinvest to reduce it, or let their capacity depreciates at
its natural rate. We speak of perfectly reversible investment when the cost of investing
is equal to the cost of disinvesting, in which case ￿rms can perfectly adapt themselves
to the stochastic evolution of the parameter. Such repeated game framework is classic in
industrial organization. However, in reality, increasing its size implies hiring new employees,
building new factories or o¢ ce, buying new equipment, and so on... These investments are
usually at least partially sunk, and the ￿rm￿ s size decisions are not perfectly reversible. We
speak of totally irreversible investment when ￿rms cannot reduce they sizes, and of partially
irreversible investment when ￿rms can decreases their size by disinvesting (but with a scrap
value inferior to the cost of investing) or by depreciation. In these cases, the theory of real
option game permits to link the hysteresis due to the irreversibility of investment and the
imperfect competition.
In this domain, Baldursson (1998), Grenadier (2002), Back and Paulsen (2009)
and Chevalier-Roignant, Huchzermeier and Trigeorgis (2011) focus on the same model of
investment. Capacities are quasi-irreversible (with linear price), time is continuous and the
parameter of demand follows a stochastic di⁄usion. Baldursson (1998) and Grenadier
3(2002) exhibit an equilibrium, and show that the optimal investment is myopic, in the sense
that ￿rms can maximize their pro￿t assuming that strategies of other players are constant.
However, Back and Paulsen (2009) shows that this equilibrium is an open-loop one, which
fails sub-game perfection. Then, Chevalier-Roignant, Huchzermeier and Trigeorgis (2011),
focuses on markov-perfect equilibrium. The authors describe the optimal markovian best
response of the ￿rms. However, the linearity of the investment cost implies in￿nite value
for the amount of investment (the capital jumps, as there is no interest to delay purchases
and sells of capital). This prevents them to fully characterize the equilibrium. Our paper
attempts to ￿ll this gap.
To do so, we start studying the simplest investment game. In a one shot model, ￿rm
have initial capacities and can invest or disinvest in a quasi-irreversible way (￿rms can buy
or sell capacities at linear but di⁄erent prices). We exhibit an area in the space of capacities,
that we name the no-move zone. If the capacities of the ￿rms are inside this no-move zone,
no ￿rm will neither invest nor disinvest. So all point of this no-move zone is a possible
equilibrium, given some initial capacities. We show that for some given initial capacities,
the equilibrium is the point of the no-move zone which minimizes the costs of investment
and disinvestment for the all industry. This e¢ ciency result holds even if ￿rms have a priori
no interest to coordinate their decisions. Furthermore, as long as the prices of investment
and disinvestment are not equal, the no-move zone is not reduced to one point, and an initial
asymmetry in capacities can be preserved.
In a continuous setting with demand uncertainty, we model the di⁄erential game in
an unusual way to overcome the issue of in￿nite investment of Chevalier-Roignant, Huchzer-
meier and Trigeorgis (2011). We ￿nd the existence of no-move zone, depending of the
demand parameter, such that ￿rms behave as in the one shot game. At each time ￿rms join
the no-move zone minimizing the industry costs of investment and disinvestment. Further-
more, this equilibrium is unique in the class of continuous markovian equilibrium.
The plan of this paper is the following. Section 2, studies the one-shot model.
Section 3 presents the dynamic model and characterizes the markovian equilibria. Section 4
concludes. All omitted proofs are reported in appendix.
42 Investment in the one-period game
2.1 The one-shot game model
The aim of this subsection is to abstract from dynamics and uncertainty issues, in order
to focus on the e⁄ect of partial irreversibility of investment. To do so, we present a simple
static model of competition in capacity.
More precisely, consider a market with n ￿rms competing ￿ la Cournot in capacities.
Each ￿rm i starts with some amount of capital ki, which can be extended or reduced through
buying or selling some assets. Purchases are made at a linear price p+, and sales at a (also
linear) price p￿ (with p￿ ￿ p+). We name Ki the capacity ￿nally installed by ￿rm i. Let
k be the vector of industry￿ s initial capacities and K the vector of installed capacities. For
￿rm i, the cost of installing a new capacity is:
C(K
i;k
i) =
8
<
:
p+ (Ki ￿ ki) if Ki ￿ ki
p￿ (Ki ￿ ki) if Ki < ki
9
=
;
: (1)
Firms produce and sell an homogenous good, at a price depending of the total quantity
￿ q =
Pn
i=1 qi. Each ￿rm￿ s production depends of its capacity, according to the technology
qi = Ki, 1 and has a cost, ci(qi). Such technology is classic in dynamic investment models,
and has been used by Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), Grenadier (2002), Merhi and Zervos
(2007) among others2. So, by selling the quantity Ki, ￿rm i obtains a payo⁄ of:
￿
i(K) = P
￿ ￿ K
￿
K
i ￿ ci(K
i); (2)
1In the one-shot model, this technology can be seen as the result of an endogenized game, in which ￿rms
buy capacities and then play a Cournot competition limited by the capacity previously bought. Indeed, no
￿rms have interest to invest in capacity which will not be used to produce, as its opponents only react to
the ￿nal quantity. (Except if the disinvestment price is negative. In this case a ￿rm has interest to keep its
unused capacity in order to avoid a disinvestment case. For example, this is the case for polluted production
site, for which the cost of decontamination is more important than the cost of conservation of this asset.)
2As it was shown in Reynolds (1987), this technology assumption is also the result of a dynamic games
with limited Cournot competition, without uncertainty. However, when there is uncertainty, ￿rms have an
incentive to keep their unused capacity for a possible further uses, when demands increases. Assuming that
quantities are equal to capacities permits to avoid such adaptability e⁄ects and focus on the direct e⁄ect of
uncertainty on capacity choice.
5where ￿ K =
Pn
j=1 Kj. The pro￿t function of ￿rm i is thus:
￿
i(K;k) = ￿
i(K) ￿ C(K
i;k
i): (3)
Note that if p￿ = p+, the investment decision is totally reversible, and the initial
capacity variable has no impact. The smaller is p￿, the more irreversible are the capacities of
the ￿rm, and, at the limit, when p￿ = ￿1, investment is totally irreversible, as in Grenadier
(2002), Back and Paulsen (2009), Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux (2012), and others.
In order to ensure the existence of the equilibrium we make the following usual hypothesis:
H1: For each i = 1;::;n, ci(:) is a twice-di⁄erentiable positive function such that c0
i ￿ 0,
c00
i ￿ 0. P(:) is also a twice-di⁄erentiable positive function, with P 0 < 0, P 00 < 0 when P is
strictly positive.3 Furthermore, for all i = 1;::;n, P 00(￿ q)qi < ￿c00
i(qi).
2.2 Best responses
In this part, we present the best response of ￿rm i. Assume that for all j 6= i, ￿rm j
installs a capacity Kj. Obviously, the marginal revenue of capacity for ￿rm i depends of the
choices of its opponents, and we note @￿i
@Ki
￿1
(x) the inverse function of the marginal revenue
of capacity, so
@￿i
@Ki
￿1
(x) = K ,
@￿i
@Ki
￿
K
1;::;K
i = K;::;K
n￿
= x.
By concavity of ￿ in Ki, such inverse function is well de￿ned and increasing. Then, ￿rm i
has three possible choices:
￿ invests (Ki > ki), and making a pro￿t:
￿
i = ￿
i(K) ￿ p
+ ￿
K
i ￿ k
i￿
;
3These conditions are not the more restrictive one could make in order to obtain theorem 1 (presented
page 8). Indeed, our proof rests on the third theorem of Novshek (1985), and the linearity of cost of
investment and disinvestment. However, as our point of interest is the dynamic game, and we need some
regularity for the existence of the dynamic di⁄erentiable equations, we place our self in the assumption made
by Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1977).
6leading to an optimal choice of capacity @￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p
+
k ). Hence, if ki > @￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p
+
k ), the monopoly
has no interest to invest.
￿ disinvests (Ki < ki), and making a pro￿t:
￿
i = ￿
i(K) + p
￿ ￿
k
i ￿ K
i￿
;
leading to an optimal capacity @￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p￿). Thus, the ￿rm has no interest to disinvest if
k < @￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p￿) (which is higher than @￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p+) ).
￿ the last possibility is to do nothing (the ￿rm neither invest nor disinvest). Indeed,
as @￿i
@Ki
￿1
(:) is increasing, the initial capacity of the ￿rm can be greater than @￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p
+
k ), so
the ￿rm has no interest to invest more, but also smaller than @￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p￿), so the ￿rm has also
no interest to disinvest.
Therefore there exists two thresholds, @￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p￿) and @￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p+) such that the ￿rm
does not wish to invest nor disinvest if its capital is between this thresholds, invest until
@￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p+) if its initial capacity is small, and disinvest until @￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p￿) if its initial capacity
is large. This can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 : The best response of ￿rm i is:
K
i
BR =
8
> > > <
> > > :
@￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p+) if k < @￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p+)
ki if ki 2
h
@￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p+); @￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p￿)
i
@￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p￿) if k > @￿i
@Ki
￿1
(p￿)
9
> > > =
> > > ;
: (4)
Of course, this best response depends of the capacities of other ￿rms, as @~ ￿i
@Ki depends
of the capacity of all ￿rms. Graphic 1 represents the best response of ￿rm 2 in the space of
capacity, for a duopoly with linear demand and no production costs.
[Insert G1]
In this graphic, we can see the existence of an area in the space of capacities, ￿2,
limited by @￿2
@K2
￿1
(p
￿
k ) and @￿2
@K2
￿1
(p
+
k ), such that, it is never optimal for ￿rm 2 to be outside
this area. Thus, if there is an equilibrium, it belongs to ￿i for all ￿rm i, so it belongs to the
intersection of these areas. Let H be this intersection. We know that all equilibria belong
7to H. Furthermore, assume that the initial distribution of capacity belongs to H. Then, if
all players except i keep their capacity constant, then the best response of i is to maintain
its initial capacity. In the case of duopoly with linear demand and no production cost, this
can be seen in graphic 2. We called H the no-move zone.
[Insert G2]
2.3 Characterization of the equilibrium
In the last subsection, we show the existence of an area in the set of space capacities,
the no-move zone H, such that all equilibria belong to H. If the initial capacities of the
￿rms are in H, the equilibrium is to keep the same capacities. This no-move zone is de￿ned
by,
H =
￿
K 2 R
n
+ : 8i = 1;::;n;
@￿i
@Ki 2 [p
￿;p
+]
￿
, (5)
which can rewritten as
H =
￿
K 2 R
n
+ : 8i = 1;::;n; P
￿ ￿ K
￿
+ P
0 ￿ ￿ K
￿
K
i ￿ ci(K
i) 2 [p
￿;p
+]
￿
(6)
However, we still do not know what the equilibrium is when the initial capacities does not
belongs to H. Theorem 1 solve this point.
Theorem 1: Assume H1. Then, there exists only one Nash equilibrium K￿, which
veri￿es:
K
￿ = arg min
K2H
n X
i=1
C(K
i;k
i): (7)
This condition is equivalent to the distance condition,
K
￿ = arg min
K2H
n X
i=1
￿ ￿K
i ￿ k
i￿ ￿. (8)
Theorem 1 provides existence and uniqueness for the equilibrium, and its character-
ization. To understand this characterization, let focus on the no-move zone. In this area,
8according to (5), the marginal revenue of each ￿rm is inferior to the price of adding a new
capacity, but superior to the price of selling some capacity, so no ￿rms wish to invest nor
disinvest. The no-move zone is thus the set in the space of capacity such that no ￿rms
change its capacity at the equilibrium. By theorem 1, H can also be view as the set of all
possible equilibria, in the meaning that all equilibrium belongs to H and all point of H can
be an equilibrium for some initial value.
There exists another way to think of H. If we de￿ne the competitive pressure as
the fact to react (for a ￿rm) to a change in opponents￿strategy, then the no-move zone is
the set of capacities without any competitive pressure. Indeed, assume that ￿rms decide to
install a capacity which belongs to H and that one ￿rm changes its strategy to implement
another capacity. Then, if the new vector of capacity belongs to the no-move zone, the other
￿rms have no new incentives to change their capacities. It does not mean that their strategy
is optimal, but if for one ￿rm the best strategy was to disinvest at the ￿rst place, its best
strategy will still be to disinvest after the change of capacity.
In this light, the best response (4) can be reinterpret as the point of H which
minimizes its cost of implementation, i.e. the cheapest vector of capacity without competitive
pressure. In theorem 1, (7) establishes that the equilibrium is the vector of capacity in the
no-move zone which minimizes its total cost of installation, for the all industry. So there
exists of some e¢ ciency in the market, in the meaning that the equilibrium will coordinate
the individual cost minimization of each ￿rm to a global cost minimization to reach the
no-move zone, a position where there is no competition pressure.
Of course, in case of totally reversible investment (when p+ = p￿) the no-move zone
is reduced to a unique point, and no industry e¢ ciency appears. This is the usual Cournot
competition4. When investment is not totally reversible, the no-move zone is a set, none
reduced to a singleton, and each point of this set can be an equilibrium for some initial values.
Graphic 3 presents which points of the no-move zone will be an equilibrium, in function of
the initial capacities, for a duopoly with linear demand and no production costs. As it can
be seen on the graphic, ￿rms with di⁄erent initial capacities can still be asymmetric at the
equilibrium, and there are di⁄erent possible symmetric equilibria, even when ￿rms has the
same pro￿t function.
4With a cost ci(Ki) + p+Ki.
9[Insert G3]
3 Investment in a dynamic game
3.1 The dynamic model
In this section, we use a variation of a classic model, as used in Baldursson (1998),
Grenadier (2002), Back and Paulsen (2009), and Chevalier-Roignant, Huchzermeier and
Trigeorgis (2011), to study the e⁄ect of dynamic and uncertainty on the previous results.
Baldursson (1998) and Grenadier (2002) exhibit open-loop equilibrium for oligopoly. How-
ever, Back and Paulsen (2009) shows that this equilibrium fails sub-game perfection. Thus,
Chevalier-Roignant, Huchzermeier and Trigeorgis (2011) focus on markovian equilibrium,
and ￿nd interesting properties. In this part, we take a further step, and fully characterize
the markovian equilibrium.
Let Ki
t be the capital of ￿rm i at time t, time is continuous and capital is partially
reversible. Let ￿i(At;K1
t ;::;Kn
t ) be the instantaneous payo⁄of ￿rm i, At being the parameter
of uncertainty, following a di⁄usion process:
dAt = ￿(At)dt + ￿(At)dWt; (9)
where Wt is a standard Wiener process. We assume Cournot competition. Let PAt(:) be the
inverse demand function, depending of the level of demand At, and some production cost
for each ￿rm, ci(:) such that
￿
i(At;K
1
t ;::;K
n
t ) = PAt
￿ ￿ Kt
￿
K
i
t ￿ c
i(K
i
t). (10)
In the following, we assume that the price is a continuous function of At, and H1. The
interest rate is r and, as previously, the purchase price of capital is p+, and the selling price
p￿. The total expected pro￿t of ￿rm i at time 0 is thus:
￿
i = E
￿Z +1
0
e
￿rt￿
i(At;K
1
t ;::;K
n
t )dt ￿ p
+
Z +1
0
e
￿rtdK
i+
t + p
￿
Z +1
0
e
￿rtdK
i￿
t jA0
￿
. (11)
10The objective of each ￿rm is to maximize its own expected pro￿t, given the initial
levels of capital and demand5. In this framework, the usual method is to introduced Ii
t, the
investment done by ￿rm i at date t, so that the capital of each ￿rm is determined by the
following di⁄erential equation:
@Ki
t
@t
= I
i
t. (12)
Chevalier-Roignant, Huchzermeier and Trigeorgis (2011) assume that investment is markovian,
so ￿rm i chooses a function of the demand level and the capital of each ￿rm, and at
each time, it invests according to the value of the state variable (demand level, capital),
Ii
t = ~ Ii(At;K1
t ;::;Kn
t ). In this case, the Bellman formula gives:
r￿
i(A;K) = sup
Ii
t
8
<
:
PAt
￿ ￿ K
￿
Ki ￿ p+ (Ii
t)+ ￿ p￿ (Ii
t)￿ + Ii
t
@￿i
@Ki + b(A)@￿i
@A +
￿2(A)
2
@2￿i
(@A)2
+
Pn
j=1
j6=i
Ij(A;K) @￿i
@Kj +
Pn
j=1
j6=i
Pn
h=1
j6=i
Ij(A;K)Ih(A;K) @2￿i
@Kj@Kh
9
=
;
.
(13)
The optimal investment policy maximizes @￿i
@KiIi
t ￿ p+ (Ii
t)+ ￿ p￿ (Ii
t)￿. So, if @￿i
@Ki 2
[p￿;p+], the ￿rm i has no interest to invest nor disinvest. Otherwise, the optimal ￿ ow
of investment Ii
t is in￿nite: the ￿rm installs its optimal capital (capital in the region
@￿i
@Ki
￿1
([p￿;p+])) instantly. The optimal capital policy of the ￿rm is thus to jump in the
area @￿i
@Ki
￿1 ￿￿
p
￿
K;p
+
K
￿￿
, and to do nothing as long as the capital stays in this area. So the
optimal strategy cannot be de￿ned by the investment variable, as the linearity of the cost of
investment implies non-continuous capital strategies.
To avoid such di¢ culty, we focus on the choice of capacity instead of investment,
assuming that Ki
t is the markovian control of ￿rm i. If time was discrete, then the choice
of capacity at time t is just a function of the level of capital at time t ￿ 1. In this case, the
optimal control at time t (Ki
t) depends on the state variable at time t (which is Ki
t￿1), which
is the markovian control of the previous period. To mimic this construction in continuous
time, the choice of capital at time t should depend on a state variable representing the level
5As usual, this maximization is done in the set of left-continuous At-adapted stochastic process. Fur-
thermore, in order to ensure the existence of (11) we also assume that the process has ￿nite variation. This
assumption is natural with our cost function. Indeed, if a ￿rm have a in￿nite variation of its capital, it will
pay an in￿nite cost of investment and disinvestment (as p+ > p￿). However, its future revenue is ￿nite (due
to hypothesis H4), which leads to a negative and in￿nite pro￿t!
11of capital of the industry just before time t. As for all s there exists another s closer to t, the
state variable will be the left limit of industry capacities. This permits to de￿ne a di⁄erent
modelization.
De￿nition: The investment game previously considered is in its markovian state-control
form if:
(i) the state variable at time t is kt = (k1
t;::;kn
t ), as de￿ned by
k
i
t = lim
s!t
s<t
K
i
t, (14)
where k0 is the given initial level of capital;
(ii) for each player i, the strategic variable is its capacity, and the strategy is markovian,
i.e. the ￿rm choose a function, ~ Ki, of the state variable (industry￿ s capacities and level of
demand) and Ki
t = ~ Ki(At;kt).
In such framework, a markov perfect equilibrium is de￿ned as usually, by the vector of
functions ~ K (:;:) =
￿
~ K￿1 (:;:);::; ~ K￿n (:;:)
￿
such that, for all (A;k) 2 R
n+1
+ ,
8i 2 f1;::;ng; ~ K
￿i (A;k) 2 arg max
Ki(:;:)
E[￿
i(A;k;K
i;( ~ K
￿j)j6=i) j A]. (15)
Furthermore, a continuous markovian equilibrium is de￿ned as a markovian equilibrium
in which the functions ~ K￿1 (:;:),.., ~ K￿n (:;:) are continuous.
To our knowledge, this is a new way to model markovian strategy. In our problem,
such de￿nition allows to properly de￿ne the best responses of the ￿rms. In the next section,
proposition 2 veri￿es that the best responses are the same in both model. In addition, this
de￿nition allows us to characterize the markov perfect equilibrium when we assume that the
strategies are continuous functions of the state variable. Theorem 2 presents the parallel
with the one-shot game in a general framework.
3.2 Characterization of the continuous markov equilibrium
In this subsection, we characterize the continuous markovian equilibria. We start by
introducing technical assumptions. H2 is needed to prove proposition 2 (in order to use Ito￿ s
Lemma, to inverse the Ito￿ s Lemma results and to apply theorem 1). H3 is classic to ensure
12the existence of strong solution to (9). H4 ensures the existence of the stochastic integral
determining the pro￿t of the ￿rms.
H2: For each i = 1;::;n, ci(:) is a four times di⁄erentiable positive function such that
c0
i ￿ 0, c00
i ￿ 0, and for all A 2 R￿
+, P(:;:) is also four times di⁄erentiable positive and strictly
concave function in each variable. Furthermore, for all i = 1;::;n, P 00(A; ￿ q)qi < ￿c00
i(qi).
H3: ￿(A) and ￿(A) are continuous functions, and verify the Lipschitz conditions.
H4: There exists a function G : R+ ! R+, such that, 8(A;x) 2 R2
+, xP(A;x) < G(A),
and
R +1
0 e￿rtG(At)dt < +1.
These assumptions allow to state proposition 2, which gives the form of the best
response in the markovian state-control form of the game.
Proposition 2: Assume H2, H3 and H4. Let i 2 f1;::;ng. In the markovian state-
control form of the game, assume that for all j 6= i, the strategy of ￿rm j, ~ Kj(:;:) is a
continuous function of the state variable. Then, for all (A;k) 2 R
n+1
+ there exists some6
continuous decreasing function ￿ : R+ ! R+ such that the best response of ￿rm i is:
~ K
i(A;k) =
8
> > <
> > :
￿A;k(p￿) if ki > ￿A;k(p￿)
ki if ki 2
￿
￿A;k(p+);￿A;k(p￿)
￿
￿A;k(p+) if ki < ￿A;k(p+)
9
> > =
> > ;
: (16)
Furthermore, the best response of ￿rm i is continuous in the state variable.
This proposition shows that the optimal capacity of ￿rm i can jump: if at some
time t, ki
t is strictly smaller than ￿A;k(p+), then the ￿rm has interest in investing instantly
to ￿A;k(p+). In this case the investment in period t is in￿nite, so the markovian state-
control form gives the same result as the regular form. However it also allows to go a step
further and to characterize the equilibria, as presented in theorem 2. In fact, at each time,
everything happens as in the one-shot game presented in the last section (with of course
some modi￿cation of the no-move zone H in order to take into account the future pro￿t).
Firms always want to invest or disinvest forthwith in order to reach the no-move zone. As
6The implicit de￿nition of ￿ is given in the proof in appendix but, for simplicity, is not presented here.
In particular, we have the property than ￿ is continuous and di⁄erentiable in a and k.
13long as they are in the no-move zone, no ￿rms change its capacity. The shape of the no-move
zone depends on the expected amount of money earned over time by unit of capacity when
￿rms keep their capacity constant,
8x > 0; v(A;x) = E
￿Z +1
0
P (At;x)e
￿rtdtjA
￿
. (17)
This value v is the ￿nite solution to the following di⁄erential equation7:
8x > 0; rv(A;x) = P (A;x) + ￿(A)
@v
@A
(A;x) +
￿2(A)
2
@2v
(@A)
2(A;x): (18)
The no-move zone is then de￿ned by:
Hv(A) =
￿
k 2 R
n
+j8i 2 f1;::;ng : v
￿￿ k
￿
+ v
0
A
￿￿ k
￿
k
i ￿
1
r
c
0
i(k
i) 2 [p
￿;p
+]
￿
. (19)
Now, we can present theorem 2.
Theorem 2: Assume H2, H3 and H4. Then, there exists at most one continuous
markov perfect equilibrium, ~ K￿ (:;:) =
￿
~ K￿1 (:;:);::; ~ K￿n (:;:)
￿
. Furthermore, for all (A;k) 2
R
n+1
+ ; i 2 f1;::;ng, this equilibrium veri￿es:
~ K
￿ (A;k) = arg min
K2Hv(A)
n X
i=1
C(K
i;k
i). (20)
This condition is equivalent to the distance condition,
~ K
￿ (A;k) = arg min
K2Hv(A)
n X
i=1
￿ ￿K
i ￿ k
i￿ ￿. (21)
Theorem 2 is the analog of theorem 1, but in a continuous time setting. It ensures
the uniqueness of the continuous markovian equilibrium, and characterizes it. At each time,
￿rms invest (or disinvest) in order to join the no-move zone at the smallest possible cost for
the industry. However, this e¢ ciency result is time-myopic. When demand evolves, ￿rms
face investment and disinvestment period, leading to a costly path of investment. This path
7Notes that (18) is not the classic Bellman di⁄erential equation. Indeed, in our proof, we just need to
characterize the pro￿t inside the no-move zone, as we already know what happens outside the no-move zone.
So (18) is just due to Ito￿ s lemma application to the evolution of uncertainty.
14of investment verify the dynamic competitive pressure, and belongs to Hv(At) at each time t.
But there is no reason to think that another path compatible with the dynamic competitive
pressure, less sensitive to the evolution of demand, which can not be less costly on the all
period.
This theorem focuses on the continuous markovian equilibrium. Nevertheless, one
can ask about other markovian equilibrium. Indeed, there is a priori no reason that collusion
can not be sustain by markovian strategy in a di⁄erential game. In a companion paper on the
same investment game, (Fagart (2013)), we exhibit a markovian equilibrium with tit-for-tat
strategy implementing the monopoly pro￿t.8
4 Conclusion
In this work, we characterize the continuous markovian equilibrium of a classic model of
investment under uncertainty whith Cournot competition. We establish the existence of an
area in the space of ￿rms￿capacities, the no-move zone, such that ￿rms invest or disinvest
in order to join this area as soon as possible, and keep their capacity constant when they
are inside this area. At the equilibrium, the ￿rms reach the point of the no-move zone which
minimizes the cost of investment of the all industry. The intuition on this result is that
the no-move is the area where other ￿rms￿actions do not impact the action of a ￿rm, so
the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium comes from the absence of competitive pressure inside the
no-move zone.
The existence of this area is due to the irreversibility of investment, and when in-
vestment is perfectly reversible, the no-move zone is reduces to a unique point, as in usual
Cournot competition. In the other case, the no-move zone is a set of vector of capacity, each
8Such collusive equilibria arise because we assume that the strategy of the players rests on the state
variable. In the classic modelization of di⁄erential games, the strategy of the players leads on the derivative
of the state variable, which imposes that the state variable will evolves continuously with time. As shown
by theorem 2 in our case, this continuity assumption provides the ￿nding of collusive equilibria when the
strategy of the player rests on the derivative of the state variable. If the ￿nding of collusive equilibria is an
argument in favor of our modelization, it also brings the question to know why the monopoly pro￿t can not
be implemented by continuous strategy.
15point of it can be an equilibrium for some initial value. It implies that the asymmetry of
an industry can be preserved at the equilibrium, even if ￿rms have the same pro￿t function.
However, when the time goes by, the parameter of uncertainty evolves, and the no-move zone
evolves with it. The issue of the evolution of an industry will be study in our companion
paper (Fagart (2013)). In particular, we show that even if ￿rm￿ s asymmetry is preserved
in the short run, it disappears in the long run, and that shocks of demand have an impact
which depends of the size of the ￿rm considered.
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